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ABSTRACT 
Memory-work was original devised by Haug and others (1987) who explained the method to an 
English speaking audience in Female Sexualization: A collective work of memory. In this paper, I 
consider the rationale for and the explanation of the “collective subject” in memory-work. 
Undertaking memory-work can involve a tension between exploring and eliding difference in the 
group. However, the implications of Haug’s particular understanding of collective subjectivity 
are an overemphasis on identifying commonalties between group members’ positions and ideas, 
at the expense of interrogating difference. Adopting Haug’s approach to collective subjectivity 
entails the risk that persistent divisions between people will be understood in terms of individual 
ignorance or personal instabilities. I propose an anti-foundational understanding of collective 
subjectivity (Butler, 1992). This doesn’t mean negating the importance of collectivity. Neither 
does it mean assuming that it will emerge, nor explaining its absence in terms of the group’s or 
an individual’s failure. Rather, an anti-foundationalist approach involves questioning the 
emergence of collective subjectivity. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of my 
discussion of collective subjectivity for analysing the discussions produced in memory-work. 
 
INTRODUCTION: WHY TALK ABOUT WE? 
In a letter to her friend and benefactor, Evelyn Scott, Jean Rhys wrote: 
 Parties are battles (most parties), a conversation is a duel (often)... I admit that 
the properly adapted human being enjoys the battle, I even admit that it can all 
be done charmingly wittily and with an air ... But I do not admit that because I 
am badly adapted to these encounters I'm therefore a mental deformity … 
(1984, p. 30-1) 
Evelyn Scott had organised a party for Jean when she visited New York. The evening was 
spectacularly unsuccessful. In Jean’s own words, she “went off the deep end” when faced with 
another guest’s unnecessary dissension. Jean writes to Evelyn apologising - “I should have 
waited till I got home like nice people do” (p. 31). 
It sounds like the episode Rhys is writing about was a lot worse than anything that has occurred 
in the memory-work groups I have organised and participated in. But as I’ve spent hours 
listening to and transcribing tapes of group discussions, and pouring over the transcripts, I have, 
on occasion wondered what people felt like or said or thought about when they got home.  
It may already be evident that the work I am discussing here, diverges both from the memory-
work originally devised by Haug and others (1987) for the purposes of researching female 
sexualisation, and from the way in which memory-work was taken up and used by Crawford, 
Kippax, Onyx, Gault & Benton (1992) to study the social construction of emotion (see Johnston 
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[this collection] for an interesting discussion on the need to take account of the political 
background of Haug et al.’s original work, and the ways in which the political context of each 
new memory-work group diverge from this) . I am basing my reflections in this paper on two 
projects. One involved researching people’s experiences of adhering to complicated medical 
regimens for the purposes of treating HIV (Stephenson 2000), and the other was my doctoral 
work on women’s experiences of conversation (Stephenson 1997; Stephenson, 2001a; 
Stephenson 2001b). In both cases any sense of undertaking “collective research or analysis” 
was confined to the group discussions of the memories, because I organised the groups and 
undertook to further analyse the memories and the group discussions and write-up the research 
(see Koutroulis [this collection] for an account of some of the particular difficulties “solo” 
memory-work researchers can encounter). It is an odd thing analysing a conversation you have 
been a part of. One of the questions it has raised for me was whether the divisions in the groups 
were deeper than they had felt like, to me at any rate, at the time. Maybe in my eagerness to 
understand what was being said, or to get a word in edgeways, I had devoted less thought to what 
was being “done charmingly wittily and with an air”. Although I would argue that this is an 
issue for memory-work groups which do undertake collective research, perhaps the fact that I 
was analysing the memories and discussions on my own, as opposed to collective analysis, has 
enabled me to revisit this question of division in memory-work groups. 
 
 
INTERPRETATION AS A WAY OF UNDERSTANDING OR ELIDING 
DIFFERENCE? 
 
Rather than go into the details of any particular group divisions which have arisen in the research 
I have undertaken, in this paper I want to consider the implications of differences within 
memory-work groups more generally. But it may help to ground what I’m saying if I give an 
example of a particular disagreement, described by the group which devised and instigated the 
use of memory-work as a method of undertaking politically charged social research (i.e., 
Andresen, Bünz-Elfferding, Haug, Hauser, Lang, Laudan, Lüdenabbm Neur, Nemitz, Neihoff, 
Prinz, Räthzel, Scheu and Thomas). What follows will illustrate a tension between exploring and 
eliding difference in memory-groups. In a chapter about “the slavegirl project”, Andresen, Haug, 
Hauser and Niehoff describe how the group had been writing about the objectification and 
commodification of women’s bodies. They discussed the skill women (are expected to) develop - 
an ability to tread a fine line between being sexual beings but not “going too far”. They decided 
to write about this issue. One woman returned to the group with a glowing description of herself 
working in a bar on a hot day, she was the only woman in the company of male customers. She 
decided to play some music and started to dance. In the written memory, she describes herself as 
a sexualised barmaid, dancing “excessively, ecstatically”, happily ignoring (or bearing) the way 
“all eyes. were turned in [her] direction” (1987, p. 149-50).  
 
On first reading of the memory, the other group members were appalled. Although described in 
terms of pleasure, the incident resonated with other women’s ideas and experiences of 
objectification; it could be read as an unambiguous account of going too far. But the author 
refused to subscribe to such an interpretation, insisting that her memory was about the pleasures 
of transgression. Her position was not dismissed outright by the rest of the group. Rather, it lead 
to a discussion about how, like Freud, they had thought that “[t]he liberty of the individual is no 
gift from civilisation. It was greatest before there was any civilisation” (quoted in Haug, 1987, p. 
151). The group could then understand the author’s interpretation in the light of the connection 
between individual freedom and transgression. Once they had articulated a notion of sexual 
freedom in these Freudian terms, the group could question it, and so question the author’s 
 2
 
 
interpretation of her memory. Instead of thinking of freedom, or sexual freedom, as something 
which we once possessed and have lost, they discussed the importance of the relationship 
between experiences of freedom and “our knowledge of a system of rules by which we are 
enabled to move within particular limits” (p. 152). The problem with the author’s initial 
interpretation was then cast as a problem with the way in which freedom is represented as 
isolation.  
 
I wonder what the author of the barmaid story thought of this new reading. If she had any 
lingering attachment to her first interpretation, it is subsumed by the use of “we” in the written 
account of the group discussion. Maybe she simply accepted the new reading of her story, or 
maybe she felt that she had shared a pleasurable moment without expecting to have it returned as 
a deeply problematic moment, or maybe she felt misunderstood, or worse. We can’t be sure, but 
reading the account of this collective analysis raises questions about how we is understood and 
practiced in memory-work. 
  
Haug writes that “[t]he aim of the group discussion [is] to uncover new linkages, and to give 
encouragement to the writer to remember more precisely” (1987, p. 56). We might consider that 
the group’s role in interpreting the memory is to undertake “the slow exposure of the meaning 
hidden” in the memory (Foucault, quoted in Scott, p. 411). If so, it would follow that we can 
approach the above discussion, about the need to rethink any notion of freedom as a state of 
isolation, asking whether it gave the author the adequate prompts to remember more precisely. 
However, if we were to take into account the fact that interpretation can be “the violent or 
surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order 
to impose a direction, to bend [humanity] to a new will, to force its participation in a different 
game”, then the political, as well as theoretical, importance of considering difference within the 
group is immediately evident (Foucault, quoted in Scott, p. 411). 
 
THE SUBJECT OF MEMORY-WORK, GIVEN OR CONSTRUCTED? 
I am interested in using memory-work as a method for developing an understanding of the 
psychological aspects of experience. If we take it that “[i]t is not individuals who have 
experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience” (Scott, 1993, p. 401), there is a 
risk that psychological research on the individual will end up contributing to an image of the 
person as fixed, unitary, bounded, self-knowing - i.e. a phallocentric subject (cf. Shotter, 1984; 
Irigaray 1985). The strength of memory-work is that it can be a means of subverting 
phallocentric subjectivity to the extent that the process avoids casting experience as a fixed 
property of the individual (Stephenson, Kippax & Crawford, 1996). Furthermore, memory-work 
can offer a way of thinking about how we become who we are which doesn’t reify subjectivity in 
the process. By that I mean that the method allows researchers to maintain a focus on becoming - 
or unbecoming (Michaels, 1990) - as opposed to being. In memory-work, instead of taking 
experiences as evidence, experience becomes the thing to be investigated - “that which we seek 
to explain, that about which knowledge is produced” (Scott, 1993, p. 401). 
In developing memory-work, Haug et al. found that “[e]ven the notions of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ 
had to be problematised” in order to avoid casting them “as fixed and knowable entities neither 
of which is subject to change” (1987, p. 35). From a methodological perspective, one way in 
which taking part in memory-work challenges the rational, unitary, fixed subject is that a co-
researcher is not automatically credited with the ultimate powers of interpretation over her own 
experience. This is evident in the example given above, of the “slavegirl” discussion. 
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Furthermore, experience isn’t thought to make the subject in any kind of deterministic, linear 
fashion. Haug explicitly opposes such a view when she argues that  
[t]o view childhood and adolescence simply as causal phases of today’s person 
is to assume that actions follow one another logically, that adult human beings 
are more or less contained within children ... Diversity is compressed and 
presented as unified evidence that we have “always” been hindered in our 
development by this or that person, this or that circumstance. (1987, p. 46-7) 
This quote captures a lot: as well as suggesting that biography can render experience seamless, 
here Haug describes a non-unitary, fluid approach to subjectivity, emphasising the importance of 
trying to engage with diversity within experience.  
But sometimes another notion of the subject is evident in Haug et al’s writing. Talking about 
written memories, Haug repeatedly argues that they have the potential to reveal “the ways in 
which individuals construct themselves into existing structures” (1987, p. 41 and again on p.52). 
This suggests that the subject exists (in some sense) before the process of its social production. 
That is, the subject is being cast as ontologically prior to her own construction (Grosz, 1994). Is 
pointing to this being petty? Perhaps this kind of description is simply a result of using a 
grammatical expression that is difficult to avoid, or maybe something got lost in translation. But, 
reading on suggests otherwise. In her chapter on “Sexuality and Power”, Hauser (in Haug et al, 
1987) argues that the problem with refusing to grant the subject ontologically prior status (i.e., a 
discursive or Foucauldian approach to subjectivity) is that “it involves negating the importance 
of the” subject (p. 204). When she writes, “Foucault’s major flaw is the absence of subjects” (p. 
205) she is concerned with the question of agency, figured as an individual capacity. I would 
agree that some work being done under the rubric of Foucault/discourse analysis does little in the 
way of helping us to understand the subject as anything other than an end product of discourse. 
But this problem is by no means unique to a researcher’s drawing on discourse (for example, see 
Watson’s (1998) use of grounded theory to approach men’s ideas of health, in which men’s 
interpretations of their experiences are implicitly characterised as determined by discourse.) 
However, we need to consider both the challenge posed by Foucauldian approaches to the role of 
the subject and its implications for empirical research on experience. It is worth making a 
distinction between throwing the baby out with the bath water (Hauser’s criticism, in Haug et al, 
1987) and asking how come it is always a baby in the bath water.  
 
Questioning the giveness of the subject doesn’t have to amount to “negating” the subject. It can 
involve taking a step back, and asking what is at stake when we invoke the subject as a starting 
point.  In taking this latter position, Butler writes that: 
 
To refuse to assume … a notion of the subject from the start is not the same as 
negating or dispensing with such a notion altogether; on the contrary, it is to ask 
after the process of its construction and the political meaning and 
consequentially of taking the subject as a requirement or presupposition of 
theory. (1992, p. 4, emphasis added) 
If I turn to the practice of memory-work, asking “what is at stake when memory-workers take the 
subject as a given?”, at least one very good answer springs to mind. Such invocations function to 
allow memory-workers to claim privileged self-knowledge and enable group members to resist 
others’ interpretations of their writing. Discussing the practice of memory-work, Haug et al. 
stress that, although an author isn’t necessarily best placed to interpret his or her own memory, 
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bringing the memory to the group isn’t simply a matter of accepting any interpretation offered by 
the others (the above example of their work does not serve as an example of this). So although 
memory-work subverts the idea that “I” can know myself” (e.g. through the practices of writing 
in the third person and taking the gaps and absences in memories as objects for analysis) it 
simultaneously allows the claim “I know myself”.  In thinking about the practice of shifting 
between these two positions, Stephenson, Kippax & Crawford (1996) talked about the latter 
move in terms of “biographising”, and argued that rather than interrupt the “pure” practice of 
memory-work, the tension created by the way memory-workers move between positions actually 
fuels the group discussion. So, there are at least two answers to my question, “what is at stake 
when Haug et al. refuse critiques of ontologically given subjectivity?” Firstly, there is a need for 
memory-workers to be able to defend themselves, and secondly, the tension between different 
notions of “the author” produces useful discussion in the groups. The situation is more 
complicated when we turn to practicing we in memory-work groups - that is, collective 
subjectivity. 
 
COLLECTIVE SUBJECTIVITY - ELIDING DIFFERENCE 
Being part of a group or collective is never a straightforward affair. How then, do we 
experience, talk about and theorise the collectivity of memory-work groups? Its importance is 
underscored by Haug. Memory-work involves analysing the workings of oppressive “existing 
structures”, looking at experience to reveal  
 
the ways in which individuals construct themselves into existing structures, and 
are thereby themselves formed; the way in which they reconstruct social 
structures; the points at which change is possible, the points where our chains 
chafe most, the points where accommodations have been made. (Haug, 1987, p. 
41, emphasis added) 
 
The point of memory-work, is to find the times and places where there may be, or have been, 
some weaknesses or flexibility in these structures, something we have overlooked or have not 
been able to see previously. Ultimately, the aim is social change. Writing about the outcome of 
memory-work, Haug states that: “In collective studies of the same object in different accounts, 
there evolved a collective subject capable of resisting some of the harmful consequences of 
traditional divisions of labour” (1987, p. 58). Change is brought about by “a collective subject”, 
the we of memory-work. By arriving at shared understandings of the ways social structures 
operate and are appropriated, Haug argues, memory-work enabled the group to “resist some 
harmful consequences”. This collective resistance is possible because, although the details of 
people’s memories may be very different, they reveal commonalties between the experiences of 
group members, and these commonalties are potentially generalisable. On the latter point, Haug 
argues that “the range of activities accessible to any given individual can be examined as 
generally available choices” (p. 45). Memory-work is portrayed as a blurring of individual 
“boundaries”: 
 
Our work begins … from the premise that the differences in our various areas 
of experience will have produced and will carry with them specific and distinct 
boundaries and separations, and that our collective work will make it possible 
to soften the edges of those rigid boundaries (p. 58) 
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In the memory-work groups in which I have participated, I think it would be fair to say that most 
people did feel like they experienced something like this from time to time. So when Haug et al. 
talk about the way in which memory work can produce a “collective subject”, I feel like I have 
some sense of what is meant. It is one of the reasons why people enjoy and continue to 
participate in the meetings (and it is not exclusive to memory-work). But it certainly cannot be 
taken it for granted. It might be argued that my caution in talking about collective subjectivity 
arises from the fact that the work I am discussing here wasn’t “true” memory-work. When 
memory-work is undertaken with one person in a chief investigator type role possibilities for 
collectivity are limited from the outset, hence the difference between the other people’s roles and 
my own could have stymied the emergence of collective subjectivity. But this explanation stops 
us from fully considering what is meant by collective subjectivity, and how it emerges. 
 
I do not want to give the impression that Haug et al. equate collectivity with consensus. For 
example, Haug describes discussions as “vehement” (p. 58), and stresses how the process of 
rewriting is supposed to, among other things, provide an opportunity to better explore and 
establish differences between group members - “by then writing against the interpretations of 
others, [we] could combine a process of self-examination with the first faltering steps to make 
[ourselves] comprehensible to others” (p. 57). But rewriting can be problematic, as Crawford et 
al. (1992) discuss. They mention that they found rewriting memories particularly difficult and 
unproductive (1992, p. 50), reasoning that their experience of rewriting diverged from that of 
Haug et al. because they had chosen to write early memories. In the group I undertook for 
studying women’s experiences of conversation we also found it difficult to rewrite memories, but 
independently of our age at the time of the events (in the second project, I discussed rewriting 
memories but did not ask participants to do it). We did give it a go a few times. But each time I 
felt uncomfortable with the level of “encouragement” required on my part to get, otherwise 
extremely keen, memory-workers to produce rewritten memories. And I had to admit that I was 
finding it no easier than anyone else. 
Again, it might be argued that the reluctance in this particular group sprung from the fact that we 
were undertaking a highly adulterated version of memory-work. We did not come together as a 
group out of a shared interest in undertaking all stages of the research on women and 
conversation. But more importantly, and this has implications for “purer” versions of memory-
work, we did not agree on issues which loomed large in the background of the research. In this 
group there were different perspectives on what “feminism” was or should be, and on the 
relationship between social practice, subjectivity and change. These differences meant that the 
frameworks for our discussions were contested. Whilst such differences generally resulted in 
good discussions, generating rich material for further analysis, when it came to rewriting the 
memories the question was put: “yes, but what are we doing it for”? Haug et al. see rewriting as 
an opportunity to clear up misunderstandings, and to integrate anything learned during the group 
discussions about the limitations, gaps and ideologically bound nature of the first versions of the 
memories. I was discouraged to find that our attempts to rewrite memories often resulted in the 
previously vague now manifesting itself as the totally unintelligible. Were we using this part of 
the process as a way of entrenching ourselves in our initial positions, of defending against things 
which had been raised in the discussion?  If so, instead of using the group discussions “as a 
means of transforming what had been up to then [our] forms of communicative incompetence”, 
we could have been signalling that our apparent inability to make some aspects of our experience 
understandable to others was actually a way of making some aspects of our experience very clear 
(Haug, 1987, p. 57): “my interpretation matters to me”. 
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This brings me back to the idea of collective subjectivity described in Female Sexualisation: A 
collective work of memory. I have already mentioned that the discussion of rewriting memories 
suggests that Haug et al. do not see memory-work as necessarily entailing agreement. Or do 
they? I want to return to the point of memory-work, as articulated by Haug: “In collective studies 
of the same object in different accounts, there evolved a collective subject capable of resisting 
some of the harmful consequences of traditional divisions of labour” (1987, p. 58). Here, talk of 
potential collectivity shifts to actuality, as members of the memory-work group are cast as a 
“collective subject”. Were all the memory-workers in the project equally enabled to resist the 
same specific divisions of labour as a result of the meetings, we might wonder, or did some 
women find themselves in the position of having their resistance strategies criticised and 
invalidated? The account of the discussion about the barmaid memory in Female Sexualization, 
suggests that the question of difference within and between co-researchers is obscured when 
Haug et al. discuss the outcome of the process in terms of collective subjectivity.  
 
Although Haug et al. avoid positioning experience as determining unitary subjectivity, the way 
in which differences between group members are obscured suggests that the process of memory-
work is being figured as evidence of “collective subjectivity”. When Haug argues that the experi-
ence of participating “[i]n collective studies of the same object in different accounts” results in 
shared, collective resistance strategies she seems to be casting this process as relatively unprob-
lematic. What is being pared away in order for these collective strategies to emerge, I wonder?  
How easily do the different meanings memory-workers’ attribute to experience collapse into the 
emergence of collective subjectivity? When “heated discussion” proves too difficult, rather than 
see this as an occasion to reflect on the many difficulties entailed in the process, Haug resorts to 
talk of “personal stability” – and by implication, instability (p. 57). 
 
 
COLLECTIVE SUBJECTIVITY - FOREGROUNDING DIFFERENCE 
 
In Haug et al’s writing, collective subjectivity plays a crucial role; it figures as a foundation for 
the development of new understandings, resistance and social change. Experience and 
subjectivity are seen as socially produced. But if we refuse subjectivity - including collective 
subjectivity - as a starting point, seeing it as discursively produced, the implications are quite 
different.  Spivak contends: “knowledge is made possible and sustained by irreducible 
difference, not identity” (quoted in Rooney, 1994, p. 161). It is not only what we identify as 
common and shared that gives rise to new understandings, but our attempts to recognise 
differences between us - as difference. This emphasises the need to be wary of the research 
methods which focus on the consolidation of identity categories, the consolidation of collective 
subjectivity, at the expense of interrogating difference (cf., Scott, 1993; Butler, 1990, 1992, 
1994). What is implied is an alternate way of thinking the connection between memory-work, 
collective subjectivity and the political: change is made possible when, instead of shoring up an a 
priori notion of collective subjectivity, we seek to question it. This latter approach involves 
taking the risk that the outcome may be a different version of collective subjectivity than the one 
with which we started.  What we share is constructed (as Haug et al. argue), but it is also possible 
to use memory-work as a means for investigating how our differences are also constructed. The 
problem with work which celebrates collective subjectivity is that, instead of helping us to 
understand difference, difference is explained away (cf. Scott, 1993, p. 399). Whilst both 
approaches seek strategies for social change, when collective subjectivity is treated as something 
which emerges unproblematically from memory-work, we risk: 
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locat[ing] resistance outside of its discursive construction and reif[ing] agency 
as an inherent attribute of individuals, thus decontextualising it ... experience 
then becomes evidence for the fact of difference, rather than a way of exploring 
how difference is established, how it operates, how and in what ways it 
constitutes subjects who see and act in the world. (Scott, 1993, p. 399-400) 
 
Instead of thinking of exercising agency and resistance as capacities with which individuals are 
endowed, if only we can identify the correct action or strategies to express them, now the 
emphasis is on trying to understand the discursive construction of agency and resistance. This is 
not achieved by focusing on the identification of commonalties, nor by engaging in the 
development of collective subjectivity at the expense of questioning the construction of 
“personal instability”. Although this poses quite a challenge to memory-work, it is one which I 
think it is possible to meet. 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RETHINKING MEMORY-WORK 
In Haug et al’s representation of memory-work, “collective subjectivity” becomes something 
which will emerge, if only people’s “personal instabilities” can be adequately managed. 
Resistance, and social change, follow on from the identification of common experience and its 
root cause in social structures. Although the idea of subjectivity as unitary is explicitly 
criticised, by default, collective subjectivity is thought as unitary. It is worth revisiting the 
dangers of fixing on the “right” articulation of commonalities between the memories, the 
“right” interpretation of the memories. Interpretation can be “the violent or surreptitious 
appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose 
a direction, to bend [memory-workers] to a new will, to force [our] participation in a different 
game” (Foucault, quoted in Scott, p. 411). This does not mean that we have to end up in a 
relativist position where we can’t say anything about memories which afford different 
readings. 
 
Relativist positions repeat the problem of essentialist and universalist positions they claim to 
critique. That is, without any understanding of the situatedness of an interpretation, it is 
impossible to evaluate the importance of any engagement with or criticism of that 
interpretation; “relativism and totalization are both ‘god-tricks’ promising vision from 
everywhere and nowhere equally and fully” (Haraway, 1991, p. X). How then might we 
approach the multiple interpretations possible of any one memory brought to a memory-work 
group in such a way as to eschew relativism? Any knowledge that we can have of the 
memories needs to be understood as partial and situated (Haraway, 1991). When we seek 
knowledge with the aim of shoring up an identity position (like that of collective subject) we 
occlude partiality. The possibility of going beyond relativism lies in the partial connections 
that can be made between the locatedness of knowers (e.g., of different group members or 
between readers and writers). This does not simply mean identifying a particular, singular 
location of each group member. It does involve adopting a “mobile positioning” in the attempt 
to understand the situatedness of different interpretations, an understanding which will always 
be incomplete (Haraway, 1991; Stephenson & Kippax, 1999). Such partial understanding can 
be a means of recognising the existence of difference in the first instance, and may become a 
way of translating between different locations and so developing knowledge of the world 
(although this may not always be possible); “partiality, not universality, is the condition of 
being heard to make rational knowledge claims” (Haraway, 1991, p. X). 
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Whilst Haug et al’s failure to consider difference in the way they theorise “collective 
subjectivity” remains a problem, the practice of memory-work need not involve the assumption 
that collectivity will necessarily emerge as long as the method is applied appropriately by those 
in the right frame of mind. If we take a different starting point for memory-work, arguing that the 
processes and relations through which subjects are continually being constituted are ones of 
differentiation and exclusion, then competing interpretations of a memory need not be seen as a 
threat to the outcome of the group. I will finish with three (related) alternatives for thinking about 
the analysis of memory-work. In the first, the job of the researcher is not necessarily to decide on 
the best interpretation of a memory, in his or her view (although, as a reader, I’d always like to 
know). The idea is to approach the analysis phase as an opportunity to foreground differences, 
where they have emerged in the group, and to try to understand the discursive constitution of 
these different positions, identifying competing discourses. In one sense, this is really just re-
framing memory-work as described by Haug, with an emphasis on the importance of 
understanding tension and conflict instead of explaining it away. The second option is an 
extension of the first. We can approach memory-work as a means of analysing “the position of 
situatedness of subjects to the knowledge they produce, and the effects of difference on 
knowledge” (Scott, 1993, p. 403). Both the memories and the interpretations people offer of 
them can be thought in terms of this relationship between the subject’s situatedness and the 
knowledge she produces (Waldby, 1995). It brings in the possibility that the situatedness of 
different group members could be such that there may be some knowledge which they cannot 
share. But now that I’ve mentioned individual subjects as opposed to “the group” or the 
collective subject, I want to raise a third possibility, in the form of a question which may be 
worth revisiting. If we continue to treat experience or psychology simply as the effect of 
repressive mechanisms, or even as the effect of discourses, maybe we overlook an important site 
for understanding our situatedness. As Biddy Martin puts it: 
 
 I have become more convinced that too thorough an evacuation of interiority, 
too total a collapse of the boundaries between public and private, and too 
exclusive an understanding of psychic life as the effect of normalization can 
impoverish the language we have available for thinking about selves and 
relationships, even as they apparently enrich our vocabularies for thinking about 
social construction. (1994, p. 106) 
What is being introduced here is the interiority, the depth aspects of the psychologies of 
individual memory-workers. Is it worth, at any stage in the process of memory-work, thinking 
about individual group members as individuals?  This question I will leave unanswered, but to 
return to the first, “If parties are Battles what are We?”, I can say that the we (i.e. those in the 
groups in which I have been involved) are a diverse group of people who exercise agency and 
resistance in different ways, who find commonalties as well as differences between us, and will 
no doubt continue to do so.  
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